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Abstract
In 1979, Hylland and Zeckhauser [HZ79] gave a simple and general scheme for implement-
ing a one-sided matching market using the power of a pricing mechanism. Their method has
nice properties – it is incentive compatible in the large and produces an allocation that is
Pareto optimal – and hence it provides an attractive, off-the-shelf method for running an ap-
plication involving such a market. With matching markets becoming ever more prevalant and
impactful, it is imperative to finally settle the computational complexity of this scheme.
We present the following partial resolution:
1. A combinatorial, strongly polynomial time algorithm for the case of 0/1 utilities, and
more generally, when each agent’s utilities come from a bivalued set.
2. An example that has only irrational equilibria, hence proving that this problem is not
in PPAD. Furthermore, its equilibria are disconnected, hence showing that the problem
does not admit a convex programming formulation.
3. A proof of membership of the problem in the class FIXP.
We leave open the (difficult) question of determining if the problem is FIXP-hard.
∗Supported in part by NSF grant CCF-1815901.
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1 Introduction
In a brilliant and by-now classic paper, Hylland and Zeckhauser [HZ79] gave a simple and
general scheme for implementing a one-sided matching market using the power of a pricing
mechanism1. Their method is incentive compatible in the large and produces an allocation that
is Pareto optimal. It can be viewed as a marriage between fractional perfect matching and a linear
Fisher market, both of which admit not only polynomial time algorithms but also combinatorial
ones. These facts have enticed numerous researchers over the years to seek an efficient algorithm
for the Hylland-Zeckhauser (HZ) scheme. The significance of this problem has only grown in
recent years, with ever more diverse and impactful matching markets being launched into our
economy, e.g., see [ftToC19].
Our work on resolving this problem started with an encouraging sign, when we obtained a
combinatorial, strongly polynomial time algorithm for the unit case, in which all utilities are 0/1,
by melding a prefect matching algorithm with the combinatorial algorithm of [DPSV08] for the
linear Fisher market, see Section 4. This algorithm can be extended to solve a more general
problem which we call the bivalued utilities case, in which each agent’s utilities can take one of
only two values, though the two values can be different for different agents. However, this
approach did not extend any further, as described in the next section.
While studying the unit case of two-sided markets, Bogomolnaia and Moulin [BM04] called it an
“important special case of the bilateral matching problem.” They gave a number of applications,
some of which are natural applications of one-sided markets as well, e.g., housemates distribut-
ing rooms, having different features, in a house. Furthermore, they say, “Time sharing is the
simplest way to deal fairly with indivisibilities of matching markets: think of a set of workers
sharing their time among a set of employers.” It turns out that the HZ (fractional) equilibrium
allocation is a superior starting point for the problem of designing a randomized time-sharing
mechanism; this is discussed in Remark 4 after introducing the HZ model.
1.1 The gamut of possibilities
Before presenting the rest of our results, it is worthwhile pointing out how we got to them. The
most useful solution for practical applications would of course have been a combinatorial, poly-
nomial time algorithm for the entire scheme. At the outset, this didn’t seem unlikely, especially
in view of the existence of such an algorithm for the unit case. Failing this, one could have
sought a rational convex program, i.e., a non-linear convex program which always has a rational
solution if all parameters are rational numbers [Vaz12], since then interior point methods could
have been employed for solving this program efficiently. However, even this approach had many
stumbling blocks.
Next we considered the generalization of the bivalued utilities case to trivalued utilities, in par-
ticular, to the case of {0, 12 , 1} utilities. The status of this case is discussed in Section 9. It turns out
that underlying the polynomial time solvability of a linear Fisher market is the property of weak
1See Remark 4 for a discussion of the advantages of this mechanism.
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gross substitutability2. This property is destroyed as soon as one goes to a slightly more gen-
eral utility function, namely piecewise-linear, concave and separable over goods (SPLC utilities).
Evidence of intractability for the latter case was established using the class PPAD introduced in
[Pap94]; the problem is PPAD-complete3 [VY11]. It turns out that equilibrium allocations for the
HZ scheme do not satisfy weak gross substitutability, e.g., see Example 8.
This led us to seek a proof of PPAD-completeness for the scheme. However, a crucial requirement
before embarking on such a proof is to show that there is always a rational equilibrium if all
parameters of the instance are rational numbers. However, even this is not true; we found an
example that admits only irrational equilibria, see Section 6. This example consists of four agents
and goods, and hence can be viewed as belonging to the four-valued utilities case; see Remark
20 for other intriguing aspects of this example. Furthermore, this example has disconnected
equilibria, hence ruling out a convex programming formulation for the HZ scheme. It was then
natural to turn to the class FIXP, introduced in [EY10], to establish intractability. Our proof of
membership in FIXP is presented in Section 8. We leave open the problem of determining if HZ
is FIXP-hard.
1.2 Related work
We are aware of only the following two computational results on the HZ scheme. Using the
algebraic cell decomposition technique of [BPR95], [DK08] gave a polynomial time algorithm for
computing an equilibrium for an Arrow-Debreu market under piecewise-linear, concave (PLC)
utilities (not necessarily separable over goods) if the number of goods is fixed. One can see
that their algorithm can be adapted to yield a polynomial time algorithm for computing an
equilibrium for the HZ scheme if the number of goods is a fixed constant. Extending these
methods, [AJKT17] gave a polynomial time algorithm for the case that the number of agents is a
fixed constant.
We note that there is a paucity of results showing membership in FIXP and FIXP-hardness for
equilibrium problems; for a description of the class FIXP, see Section 7. The quintessential com-
plete problem for this class is multiplayer Nash equilibrium [EY10]. For the case of market
equilibria, in the economics literature, there are two parallel streams of results: one assumes that
an excess demand function is given and the other assumes a specific class of utility functions.
We provide below all FIXP-based results we are aware of for both streams.
[EY10] proved FIXP-completeness of Arrow-Debreu markets whose excess demand functions are
algebraic. Hence this result is for the first stream and it does not establish FIXP-completeness
of Arrow-Debreu markets under any specific class of utility functions. Results for the second
stream include proofs of membership in FIXP for Arrow-Debreu markets under Leontief and
piecewise-linear concave (PLC) utility functions in [Yan13] and [GMV16], respectively. This was
followed by a proof of FIXP-hardness for Arrow-Debreu markets with Leontief and PLC utilities
[GMVY17]. For the case of Arrow-Debreu markets with CES (constant elasticity of substitution)
utility functions, [CPY17] show membership in FIXP but leave open FIXP-hardness.4
2Namely, if you increase the price of one good, the demand of another good cannot decrease.
3Independently, PPAD-hardness was also established in [CT09].
4Computing approximate equilibria for CES markets is PPAD-complete [CPY17].
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In recent years, several researchers have proposed Hylland-Zeckhauser-type mechanisms for a
number of applications, e.g., see [Bud11, HMPY18, Le17, McL18]. The basic scheme has also
been generalized in several different directions, including two-sided matching markets, adding
quantitative constraints, and to the setting in which agents have initial endowments of goods
instead of money, see [EMZ19a, EMZ19b].
2 The Hylland-Zeckhauser Scheme
Hylland and Zeckhauser [HZ79] gave a general mechanism for a one-sided matching market
using the power of a pricing mechanism. Their formulation is as follows: Let A = {1, 2, . . . n}
be a set of n agents and G = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a set of n indivisible goods. The mechanism will
allocate exactly one good to each agent and will have the following two properties:
• The allocation produced is Pareto optimal.
• The mechanism is incentive compatible.
The Hylland-Zeckhauser scheme is a marriage between linear Fisher market and fractional per-
fect matching. The agents will reveal to the mechanism their desires for the goods by stating
their von Neumann-Mogenstern utilities. Let uij represent the utility of agent i for good j. We
will use language from the study of market equilibria to describe the rest of the formulation. For
this purpose, we next define the linear Fisher market model.
A linear Fisher market consists of a set A = {1, 2, . . . n} of n agents and a set G = {1, 2, . . . ,m} be
a set of m infinitely divisible goods. By fixing the units for each good, we may assume without
loss of generality that there is a unit of each good in the market. Each agent i has money mi
and utility uij for a unit of good j. If xij, 1 ≤ j ≤ m is the bundle of goods allocated to i, then the
utility accrued by i is ∑j uijxij. Each good j is assigned a non-negative price, pj. Allocations and
prices, x and p, are said to form an equilibrium if each agent obtains a utility maximizing bundle
of goods at prices p and the market clears, i.e., each good is fully sold and all money of agents is
fully spent.
In order to mold the one-sided market into a linear Fisher market, the HZ scheme renders goods
divisible by assuming that there is one unit of probability share of each good. An allocation to
an agent is a collection of probability shares over the goods. Let xij be the probability share that
agent i receives of good j. Then, ∑j uijxij is the expected utility accrued by agent i. Each good
j has price pj ≥ 0 in this market and each agent has 1 dollar with which it buys probability
shares. The entire allocation must form a fractional perfect matching in the complete bipartite graph
over vertex sets A and G as follows: there is one unit of probability share of each good and
the total probability share assigned to each agent also needs to be one unit. Subject to these
constraints, each agent should buy a utility maximizing bundle of goods. By definition, under
such an allocation and prices, the market clears. We will define these to be an equilibrium allocation
and prices; we state this formally below after giving some preliminary definitions.
Definition 1. Let x and p denote arbitrary allocations and prices of goods. By size, cost and value
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of agent i’s bundle we mean
∑
j∈G
xij, ∑
j∈G
pjxij and ∑
j∈G
uijxij,
respectively. We will denote these by size(i), cost(i) and value(i), respectively.
Definition 2. (Hylland and Zeckhauser [HZ79]) Allocations and prices (x, p) form an equilibrium
for the one-sided matching market stated above if:
1. The total probability share of each good j is 1 unit, i.e., ∑i xij = 1.
2. The size of each agent i’s allocation is 1, i.e., size(i) = 1.
3. The budget of each agent is 1 dollar and price of each good is non-negative.
4. Subject to these constraints, each agent i maximizes her expected utility, i.e., maximize
value(i), subject to size(i) = 1 and cost(i) ≤ 1.
Using Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, the following is shown:
Theorem 3. [Hylland and Zeckhauser [HZ79]] Every instance of the one-sided market defined above
admits an equilibrium.
Note that unlike the linear Fisher market, in which at equilibrium each agent i must spend her
money mi fully, in the HZ scheme, i need not spend her entire dollar. Pareto optimality of
the allocation follows from the well-known fact that allocations made at market equilibrium are
Pareto optimal. Finally, if this “market” is large enough, no individual agent will be able to
improve her allocation by misreporting utilities nor will she be able to manipulate prices. For
this reason, the HZ scheme is Pareto optimal in the large.
As stated above, Hylland and Zeckhauser transform the original matching market problem, in-
volving indivisible goods, to fractional assignments of probability shares of the goods, in order to
render them divisible and bring to bear the vast machinery of market equilibria on the problem.
However, their interest is still in solving the original problem, and to this end, they view each
agent’s allocation as a lottery over goods. In this viewpoint, agents accrue utility in an expected
sense from their allocations. Once these lotteries are resolved in a manner faithful to the proba-
bilities, an assignment of indivisible goods will result. As is well known, since the assignment is
Pareto optimal ex ante, it will also be Pareto optimal ex post. Rather than executing the lotteries
in a banal manner, Hylland and Zeckhauser give an elegant randomized procedure for rounding
which uses randomness more efficiently.
Remark 4. In their paper studying the unit case of two-sided matching markets, Bogomolnaia
and Moulin [BM04] state that the preferred way of dealing with indivisibilities inherent in match-
ing markets is to resort to time sharing using randomization. Their method builds on the Gallai-
Edmonds decomposition of the underlying bipartite graph; this classifies vertices into three cat-
egories: disposable, over-demanded and perfectly matched. This is a much more coarse insight
into the demand structure of vertices than that obtained via the HZ equilibrium. The latter is
the output of a market mechanism in which equilibrium prices reflect the relative importance of
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goods in an accurate and precise manner, based on the utilities declared by buyers, and equilib-
rium allocations are as equitable as possible across buyers. Hence the latter yields a more fair
and desirable randomized time-sharing mechanism.
3 Properties of Optimal Allocations and Prices
Let p be given prices which are not necessarily equilibrium prices. An optimal bundle for agent
i, xi, is a solution to the following LP, which has two constraints, one for size and one for cost.
max ∑
j
xijuij
s.t.
∑
j
xij = 1
∑
j
xijpj ≤ 1
∀j xij ≥ 0
Taking µi and αi to be the dual variables corresponding to the two constraints, we get the dual
LP:
min αi + µi
s.t.
∀i, j αipj + µi ≥ uij
αi ≥ 0
Clearly µi is unconstrained. µi will be called the offset on i’s utilities. By complementary slack-
ness, if xij is positive then αipj = uij − µi. All goods j satisfying this equality will be called optimal
goods for agent i. The rest of the goods, called suboptimal, will satisfy αipj > uij − µi. Obviously
an optimal bundle for i must contain only optimal goods.
The parameter µi plays a crucial role in ensuring that i’s optimal bundle satisfies both size and
cost constraints. If a single good is an effective way of satisfying both size and cost constraints,
then µi plays no role and can be set to zero. However, if different goods are better from the
viewpoint of size and cost, then µi attains the right value so they both become optimal and i
buys an appropriate combination. We provide an example below to illustrate this.
Example 5. Suppose i has positive utilities for only two goods, j and k, with uij = 10, uik = 2
and their prices are pj = 2, pk = 0.1. Clearly, neither good satisfies both size and cost constraints
optimally: good j is better for the size constraint and k is better for the cost constraint. If i buys
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one unit of good j, she spends 2 dollars, thus exceeding her budget. On the other hand, she
can afford to buy 10 units of k, giving her utility of 20; however, she has far exceeded the size
constraint. It turns out that her optimal bundle consists of 9/19 units of j and 10/19 units of k;
the costs of these two goods being 18/19 and 1/19 dollars, respectively. Clearly, her size and cost
constraints are both met exactly. Her total utility from this bundle is 110/19. It is easy to see that
αi = 80/19 and µi = 30/19, and for these settings of the parameters, both goods are optimal.
We next show that equilibrium prices are invariant under the operation of scaling the difference
of prices from 1.
Lemma 6. Let p be an equilibrium price vector and fix any r > 0. Let p′ be such that ∀j ∈ G,
p′j − 1 = r(pj − 1). Then p′ is also an equilibrium price vector.
Proof. Consider an agent i. Clearly, ∑j∈G pjxij ≤ 1. Now,
∑
j∈G
p′jxij = ∑
j∈G
(rpj − r+ 1)xij ≤ 1,
where the last inequality follows by using ∑j∈G xij = 1.
Using Lemma 6, it is easy to see that if the allocation x provides optimal bundles to all agents
under prices p then it also does so under p′. In the rest of this paper we will enforce that the
minimum price of a good is zero, thereby fixing the scale. Observe that the main goal of the
Hylland-Zeckhauser scheme is to yield the “correct” allocations to agents; the prices are simply
a vehicle in the market mechanism to achieve this. Hence arbitrarily fixing the scale does not
change the essential nature of the problem. Moreover, setting the minimum price to zero is
standard [HZ79] and can lead to simplifying the equilibrium computation problem as shown in
Remark 7.
Remark 7. We remark that on the one hand, the offset µi is a key enabler in construing optimal
bundles, on the other, it is also a main source of difficulty in computing equilibria for the HZ
scheme. We identify here an interesting case in which µi = 0 and this difficulty is mitigated.
In particular, this holds for all agents in the unit case presented in Section 4. Suppose good j is
optimal for agent i, uij = 0 and pj = 0, then it is easy to check that µi = 0. If so, the optimal
goods for i are simply the maximum bang-per-buck goods; the latter notion is replete in market
equilibrium papers, e.g., see [DPSV08].
Finally, we extend Example 5 to illustrate that optimal allocations for the Hylland-Zeckhauser
model do not satisfy the weak gross substitutes condition in general.
Example 8. In Example 5, let us raise the price of k to 0.2 dollars. Then, the demands for j and
k become 4/9 and 5/9, respectively. Notice that the demand for j went down from 9/19 to 4/9.
One way to understand this change is as follows: Let us start with the old allocation of 10/19
units of k. Clearly, the price of this allocation of k goes up from 1/19 to 2/19, leaving only 17/19
dollars for j. Therefore size of j needs to be reduced to 17/38. However, now the sum of the sizes
becomes 37/38, i.e., less than a unit. We wish to increase this to a unit while still keeping cost at
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a unit. The only way of doing this is to sell some of the more expensive good and use the money
to buy the cheaper good. This is the reason for the decrease in demand of j.
4 Strongly Polynomial Algorithm for Bivalued Utilities Case
In this section, we will study the restriction of the HZ scheme to the bivalued utilities case, which
is defined as follows: for each agent i, we are given a set {ai, bi}, where 0 ≤ ai < bi, and the
utilities uij, ∀j ∈ G, are picked from this set. However first, using a perfect matching algorithm
and the combinatorial algorithm [DPSV08] for linear Fisher markets, we will give a strongly
polynomial time algorithm for the unit case, i.e., when all utilities uij are 0/1. Next we define the
notion of equivalence of utility functions and show that the bivalued utilities case is equivalent
to the unit case, thereby extending the unit case algorithm to this case.
We need to clarify that we will not use the main algorithm from [DPSV08], which uses the notion
of balanced flows and l2 norm to achieve polynomial running time. Instead, we will use the
“simple algorithm” presented in Section 5 in [DPSV08]. Although this algorithm is not proven
to be efficient, the simplified version we define below, called Simplified DPSV Algorithm, is
efficient; in fact it runs in strongly polynomial time, unlike the balanced-flows-based algorithm
of [DPSV08]. Remark 7 provides an insight into what makes the unit case computationally easier.
Notation: We will denote by H = (A,G, E) be the bipartite graph on vertex sets A and G, and
edge set E, with (i, j) ∈ E iff uij = 1. For A′ ⊆ A and G′ ⊆ G, we will denote by H[A′,G′] the
restriction of H to vertex set A′ ∪G′. If ν is a matching in H, ν ⊆ E, and (i, j) ∈ ν then we will say
that ν(i) = j and ν(j) = i. For any subset S ⊆ A (S ⊆ G), N(S) will denote the set of neighbors,
in G (A), of vertices in S.
If H has a perfect matching, the matter is straightforward as stated in Steps 1a and 1b; allocations
and prices are clearly equilibrium. For Step 2, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 9. The following hold:
1. For any set S ⊆ A2, |N(S)| ≥ |S|.
2. For any set S ⊆ G1, |N(S) ∩ A1| ≥ |S|.
Proof. 1). If |N(S)| < |S| then (G1 ∪ N(S)) ∪ (A2 − S) is a smaller vertex cover for H, leading to
a contradiction.
2). If |N(S) ∩ A1| < |S| then (G1− S) ∪ (A2 ∪ N(S)) is a smaller vertex cover for H, leading to a
contradiction.
The first part of Lemma 9 together with Hall’s Theorem implies that a maximum matching in
H[A2,G2] must match all agents. Therefore in Step 2a, each agent i ∈ A2 is allocated one unit of
a unique good from which it derives utility 1; clearly, this is an optimal bundle for i. The number
of goods that will remain unmatched in G2 at the end of this step is |G2| − |A2|.
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Algorithm 10. Algorithm for the Unit Case
1. If H has a perfect matching, say ν, then do:
(a) ∀i ∈ A: allocate good ν(i) to i.
(b) ∀j ∈ G: pj ← 0. Go to Step 3.
2. Else do:
(a) Find a minimum vertex cover in H, say G1 ∪ A2, where G1 ⊂ G and A2 ⊂ A.
Let A1 = A− A2 and G2 = G− G1.
(b) Find a maximum matching in H[A2,G2], say ν.
(c) ∀i ∈ A2: allocate good ν(i) to i.
(d) ∀j ∈ G2: pj ← 0.
(e) Run the Simplified DPSV Algorithm on agents A1 and goods G1.
(f) ∀i ∈ A1: Allocate unmatched goods of G2 to satisfy the size constraint.
3. Output the allocations and prices computed and Halt.
Allocations are computed for agents in A1 as follows. First, Step 2e uses the Simplified DPSV
Algorithm, which we describe below, to compute equilibrium allocations and prices for the sub-
market consisting of agents in A1 and goods in G1. At the end of this step, the money of each
agent in A1 is exhausted; however, her allocation may not meet the size constraint. To achieve
the latter, Step 2f allocates the unmatched zero-priced goods from G2 to agents in A1. Clearly,
the total deficit in size is |A1| − |G1|. Since this equals |G2| − |A2|, the market clears at the end of
Step 2f. As shown in Lemma 11, each agent in A1 also gets an optimal bundle of goods.
Let p be the prices of goods in G1 at any point in this algorithm. As a consequence of the second
part of Lemma 9, the equilibrium price of each good in G1 will be at least 1. The Simplified DPSV
algorithm will initialize prices of goods in G1 to 1 and declare all goods active. The algorithm
will always raise prices of active goods uniformly5.
For S ⊆ G1 let p(S) denote the sum of the equilibrium prices of goods in S. A key notion from
[DPSV08] is that of a tight set; set S ⊆ G1 is said to be tight if p(S) = |N(S)|, the latter being
the total money of agents in A1 who are interested in goods in S. If set S is tight, then the local
market consisting of goods in S and agents in N(S) clears. To see this, one needs to use the
flow-based procedure given in [DPSV08] to show that each agent i ∈ N(S) can be allocated 1
dollar worth of those goods in S from which it accrues unit utility. Thus equilibrium has been
reached for goods in S.
As the algorithm raises prices of all goods in G1, at some point a set S will go tight. The algorithm
then freezes the prices of its goods and removes them from the active set. It then proceeds to raise
the prices of currently active goods until another set goes tight, and so on, until all goods in G1
are frozen.
5In [DPSV08], prices of active goods are raised multiplicatively, which amounts to raising prices of active goods
uniformly for our simplified setting.
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We can now explain in what sense we need a “simplified” version of the DPSV algorithm. As-
sume that as some point, S ⊂ G1 is frozen and goods in G1 − S are active and their prices are
raised. As this happens, agents in A1 − N(S) start preferring goods in S relative to those in
G1 − S. In the general case, at some point, an agent i ∈ (A1 − N(S)) will prefer a good j ∈ S as
much as her other preferred goods. At this point, edge (i, j) is added to the active graph. As a
result, some set S′ ⊆ S, containing j, will not be tight anymore and will be unfrozen. However,
in our setting, the utilities of agents in (A1 − N(S)) for goods in S is zero, and therefore no new
edges are introduced and tight sets never become unfrozen. Hence the only events of the Sim-
plified DPSV Algorithm are raising of prices and freezing of sets. Clearly, there will be at most
n freezings. One can check details in [DPSV08] to see that the steps executed with each freez-
ing run in strongly polynomial time, hence making the Simplified DPSV Algorithm a strongly
polynomial time algorithm6.
Lemma 11. Agents in A1 will get optimal bundles of goods.
Proof. Assume that the algorithm freezes k sets, S1, . . . Sk, in that order; the union of these sets
being G1. Let p1, p2, . . . pk be the prices of goods in these sets, respectively. Clearly, successive
freezings will be at higher and higher prices and therefore, 1 ≤ p1 < p2 < . . . < pk, and for
1 ≤ j ≤ k, pj = |N(Sj)|/|Sj|. If i ∈ N(Sj), the algorithm will allocate 1/pj amount of goods to i
from Sj, costing 1 dollar.
By definition of neighborhood of sets, if i ∈ N(Sj), then i cannot have edges to S1, . . . Sj−1 and can
have edges to Sj+1, . . . , Sk. Therefore, the cheapest goods from which it accrues unit utility are in
Sj, the set from which she gets 1 dollar worth of allocation. The rest of the allocation of i, in order
to meet i’s size constraint, will be from G2, which are zero-priced and from which i gets zero
utility. Clearly, i gets a utility maximizing bundle satisfying both size and cost constraints.
Since all steps of the algorithm, namely finding a maximum matching, a minimum vertex cover
and running the Simplified DPSV Algorithm, can be executed in strongly polynomial time, we
get:
Lemma 12. Algorithm 10 finds equilibrium prices and allocations for the unit case of the Hylland-
Zeckhauser scheme. It runs in strongly polynomial time.
Definition 13. Let I be an instance of the HZ scheme and let the utility function of agent i be
ui = {ui1, ui12, . . . , uin}. Then u′i = {u′i1, u′i12, . . . , u′in} is equivalent to ui if there are two numbers
s > 0 and h ≥ 0 such that for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, u′ij = s · uij + h. The numbers s and h will be called the
scaling factor and shift, respectively.
Lemma 14. Let I be an instance of the HZ scheme and let the utility function of agent i be ui. Let u
′
i be
equivalent to ui and let I
′ be the instance obtained by replacing ui by u′i in I. Then x and p are equilibrium
allocation and prices for I if and only if they are also for I ′.
Proof. Let s and h be the scaling factor and shift that transform ui to u
′
i. By the statement of the
lemma, xi = {xi1, . . . , xin} is an optimal bundle for i at prices p and hence is a solution to the
6In contrast, in the general case, the number of freezings is not known to be bounded by a polynomial in n, as
stated in [DPSV08].
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optimal bundle LP given in Section 5. The objective function of this LP is
n
∑
j=1
uijxij.
Next observe that the objective function of the corresponding LP for i under instance I ′ is
n
∑
j=1
u′ijxij =
n
∑
j=1
(s · uij + h)xij = h+ s ·
n
∑
j=1
uijxij,
where the last equality follows from the fact that ∑nj=1 xij = 1. Therefore, the objective function
of the second LP is obtained from the first by scaling and shifting. Furthermore, since the
constraints of the two LPs are identical, the optimal solutions of the two LPs are the same. The
lemma follows.
Next, let ui be bivalued with the two values being 0 ≤ a < b. Obtain u′i from ui by replacing a by
0 and b by 1. Then, u′i is equivalent to ui, with the shift and scaling being a and b− a, respectively.
Therefore the bivalued instance can be transformed to a unit instance, with both having the same
equilibria. Now using Lemma 12 we get:
Theorem 15. There is a strongly polynomial time algorithm for the bivalued utilities case of the Hylland-
Zeckhauser scheme.
5 Characterizing Optimal Bundles
In this section we give a characterization of optimal bundles for an agent at given prices p which
are not necessarily equilibrium prices. This characterization will be used critically in Section 8
and to some extent in Section 6.
Notation: For each agent i, let G∗i ⊆ G denote the set of goods from which i derives maximum
utility, i.e., G∗i = argmaxj∈G{uij}. With respect to an allocation x, let Bi = {j ∈ G | xij > 0}, i.e.,
the set of goods in i’s bundle.
We identify the following four types of optimal bundles.
Type A bundles: αi = 0 and cost(i) < 1.
By complementary slackness, optimal goods will satisfy uij = µi and suboptimal goods will
satisfy uij < µi. Hence the set of optimal goods is G
∗
i and Bi ⊆ G∗i . Note that the prices of goods
in Bi can be arbitrary, as long as cost(i) < 1.
Type B bundles: αi = 0 and cost(i) = 1.
The only difference from the previous type is that cost(i) is exactly 1. The reason for distinguish-
ing the two types will become clear in Section 8.
Type C bundles: αi > 0 and all optimal goods for i have the same utility.
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Recall that good j is optimal for i if7 αipj = uij − µi. Suppose goods j and k are both optimal.
Then uij = uik and αipj = uij − µi = uik − µi = αipk, i.e., pj = pk. Since αi > 0, by complementary
slackness, cost(i) = 1. Further, since size(i) = 1, we get that each optimal good has price 1.
Type D bundles: αi > 0 and not all optimal goods for i have the same utility.
Suppose goods j and k are both optimal and uij 6= uik. Then αipj = uij − µi 6= uik − µi = αipk,
i.e., pj 6= pk. Therefore optimal goods have at least two different prices. Since αi > 0, by
complementary slackness, cost(i) = 1. Further, since size(i) = 1, there must be an optimal
good with price more than 1 and an optimal good with price less than 1. Finally, if good z is
suboptimal for i, then αipz < uiz − µi.
6 An Irrational Example
Our example has 4 agents A1, . . . , A4 and 4 goods g1, . . . , g4
8. The agents’ utilities for the goods
are given in Table 1, with rows correspond to agents and columns to goods. The quantity −∞
stands for a sufficiently large negative number −M (−M ≤ −20 suffices). If desired, we can shift
up the utilities so that they are nonnegative.
Table 1: Agents’ utilities.
g1 g2 g3 g4
A1 10 20 −∞ 40
A2 10 15 −∞ 40
A3 10 −∞ 30 −∞
A4 −∞ 20 30 −∞
Thus, agents A1 and A2 like, to varying degrees, three goods only, g1, g2, g4, while agents A3 and
A4 like two goods each, {g1, g3} and {g2, g3}, respectively. The precise values of the utilities are
not important; the important aspects are: which goods each agent likes, the order between them,
and the ratios u14−u12u12−u11 and
u24−u22
u22−u21 . Notice that the latter are unequal.
We will show that this example has two equilibrium solutions. In both solutions, agents A3 and
A4 buy the two goods that they like. In one solution, A1 buys only the goods g2 and g4, and A2
buys all three goods g1, g2, g4, while in the other solution, A1 buys all three goods g1, g2, g4 and
A2 buys g1 and g4 only. In both solutions, the minimum price of a good is 0 and the price of the
other three goods is irrational.
Lemma 16. Equilibrium prices satisfy:
0 = p1 < p2 < 1 and p3, p4 > 1.
The equilibrium bundle of each agent is of Type D and contains goods having positive utilities only.
7Note that under this case, optimal goods are not necessarily maximum utility goods; the latter may be suboptimal
because their prices are too high.
8It is easy to see, by analyzing relations in the bipartite graph on agents and goods with edges corresponding to
non-zero allocations, that any instance with 3 agents and 3 goods and rational utilities has a rational equilibrium.
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Proof. Suppose p3 ≤ 1. Then agents A3 and A4 will demand 1 unit each of good g3, leading to
a contradiction. Similarly, if p4 ≤ 1 then A1 and A2 will demand 1 unit each of g4. Therefore,
p3, p4 > 1. Since the maximum utility goods of every agent have price > 1, all agents spend
exactly 1. Therefore, the sum of the prices of the goods is 4.
Suppose p2 = 0 ≤ p1. Then A1, A2, A4 do not buy g1, since they prefer g2 and it is weakly
cheaper than g1. Therefore A3 must buy the entire unit of g1. Clearly A1, A2 do not buy g3, since
they prefer g2. Therefore, the only agent who buys g3 is A4; however, she cannot afford the entire
unit of g3 since p3 > 1, contradicting market clearing. Therefore p2 > 0 and hence the 0-priced
good is g1 and p1 = 0 < p2. Furthermore, p2 + p3 + p4 = 4.
Next suppose p2 ≥ 3/4. Then p4 = 4 − (p2 + p3) < 9/4. For both agents A1 and A2, a
combination of g1 and g4 in proportion 2:1 has a price less than 3/4 for one unit and utility
20, and is therefore preferable to g2. Hence, A1, A2 will not buy any g2, and since A3 does not
buy any g2 either, since she prefers g1, it follows that A4 must buy the entire unit of g2. This
is possible only if p2 = 1 and A4 buys nothing else; in particular, she does not buy any g3.
Clearly, A1, A2 do not buy any g3 since they prefer g1. Therefore the entire unit of g3 must be
bought by A3, which is impossible because p3 > 1. Hence p2 < 3/4. These facts together with
p1 = 0 < p2 < 1 < p3, p4 imply that the agents’ bundles are not Type B or C. Therefore they are
all of Type D.
Finally we prove that none of the agents will buy an undesirable good. For A1, A2, A3, such a
good is dominated by another lower-priced good. Since p4 > 1, A4 does not buy g4. Suppose
agent A4 buys good g1. Since she spends 1 dollar, she must also buy g3. Therefore we have:
α4p1 + µ4 = u41 = −M, where M ≥ 2). Therefore µ4 = −M. Also α4p3 + µ4 = u43 = 30,
therefore α4p3 = M+ 30. Furthermore, α4p2 + µ4 ≥ u42 = 20, hence p2 ≥ (M + 20)/(M + 30),
which contradicts p2 < 3/4. Therefore, no agent buys any undesirable good.
Lemma 17. One of the agents A1, A2 buys all three desirable goods. If A1 buys g1, g2, g4, then A2 buys
g1, g4 only. If A2 buys g1, g2, g4, then A1 buys g2, g4 only.
Proof. Since all the bundles are of Type D, every bundle has at least two goods; clearly, every
good is bought by at least two agents.
Suppose that every agent buys two goods and every good is bought by two agents. If so, one
of A1, A2 must buy g1, g4 and the other must buy g2, g4. Consider the graph with the goods as
nodes and an edge joining two nodes if they are bought by the same agent. This graph must be
the 4-cycle g1, g4, g2, g3, g1. Therefore for some a, 0 < a < 1, each agent buys a units of one good
and b = 1− a units of the second good and each good is sold to two agents in the amounts of a
and b.
Let ri = |1− pi|. Observe that for every edge (gi, gj) of the cycle, one price is < 1 and the other
price is > 1, and we have api + bpj = 1. Therefore ari − brj = 0, and rir j = ba . Hence
r1
r4
=
r4
r2
=
r2
r3
=
r3
r1
,
which implies that all the ri are equal. Therefore p1 = p2, contradicting the previous claim that
p1 < p2. Hence at least one of A1, A2 will buy all three of her desirable goods.
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Suppose that A1 buys all three desirable goods g1, g2, g4. Then we have α1pj + µ1 = u1j for
j = 1, 2, 4. Therefore, (p4 − p1)/(p4 − p2) = (u14 − u11)/(u14 − u12) = 30/20. Agent A2 buys
g4 and at least one of g1, g2. Suppose she buys g2. Then α2pj + µ2 = u2j for j = 2, 4, hence
α2(p4 − p2) = u24 − u22 = 25. This implies that α2(p4 − p1) > 30 = u24 − u21, hence α2p1 + µ2 <
u21, a contradiction. Therefore A2 does not buy g2 and she buys g1 and g4 only.
Next suppose A2 buys all three desirable goods g1, g2, g4. By a similar argument we will prove
that A1 buys only two goods. We have α2pj + µ2 = u2j for j = 1, 2, 4. Therefore, (p4 − p1)/(p4 −
p2) = (u24 − u21)/(u24 − u22) = 30/25. Agent A1 buys g4 and at least one of g1, g2. Suppose that
she buys g1. Then α2pj + µ2 = u2j for j = 1, 4, hence α2(p4 − p1) = u24 − u21 = 30. This implies
that α2(p4 − p2) > 20 = u14− u12, hence α2p2 + µ2 < u12, a contradiction. Therefore, A1 does not
buy g1, hence she buys g2 and g4 only.
Theorem 18. The instance of Table 1 has two equilibria; in both, allocations to agents and prices of goods,
other than the zero-priced good, are all irrational.
1. p1 = 0, p2 = (23−
√
17)/32, p3 = (9+
√
17)/8, p4 = (69− 3
√
17)/32.
2. p1 = 0, p2 = (41−
√
113)/98, p3 = (15+
√
113)/14, p4 = (246− 6
√
113)/98.
Proof. Let ri = |1− pi|. By Lemma 16, r1 = 1. We consider the two cases established in Lemma
17.
Case 1. A1 buys g1, g2, g4, and A2 buys g1, g4.
Agent A3 spends her dollar on goods g1, g3 in the proportion r3 : r1, i.e., r3 : 1. Therefore,
x31 =
r3
1+r3
, x33 =
1
1+r3
. Agent A4 buys goods g2, g3 in the proportion r3 : r2. Therefore, x42 =
r3
r2+r3
, x43 =
r2
r2+r3
. Since only agents A3 and A4 buy good g3, we have x31 = 1− x33 = x43, and
x42 = 1− x43 = x33. This implies r23 = r2 ... (1).
Since agent A1 buys g1, g2, g4, we have,
u14−u12
u12−u11 =
p14−p12
p12−p11 . Therefore r2 + r4 = 2(1− r2) ... (2).
Agent A2 buys goods g1, g4 in the proportion r4 : r1. Therefore, x21 =
r4
1+r4
, x24 =
1
1+r4
. Hence,
x14 = 1− x24 = r41+r4 .
Since g2 is bought by A1 and A2 only, we have x12 = 1− x42 = r2r2+r3 .
Since the cost of A1’s bundle is 1, p1x11 + p2x12 + p4x14 = 1. Therefore, (1 − r2) r2r2+r3 + (1 +
r4)
r4
1+r4
= 1. Hence, (1− r2)r2 + (r4 − 1)(r2 + r3) = 0 ... (3).
Now we have three equations, (1), (2) and (3), in three unknowns r1, r2, r3. Using (1) and (2) we
can express r1 and r2 in terms of r3. Letting r3 = y, we have from (1), r2 = y
2, and from (2),
r4 = 2− 3r2 = 2− 3y2. Substituting into (3), we get (1− y2)y2 + (1− 3y2)(y2 + y) = 0, which
simplifies to y(y+ 1)(4y2 − y− 1) = 0.
The only positive solution is y = 1+
√
17
8 . Therefore,
p1 = 0, p2 = 1− r2 = 1− y2 = 23−
√
17
32
, p3 = 1+ r3 = 1+ y =
9+
√
17
8
,
14
p4 = 1+ r4 = 3− 3y2 = 69− 3
√
17
32
.
Once we have the value of y, we get:
r1 = 1, r2 = y
2, r3 = y and r4 = 2(1− y2)− y.
In terms of these four values, the allocations of the agents are:
A1 : x12 =
r2
r2 + r3
, x13 = 1− 1
1+ r3
− r2
r2 + r3
, r14 =
r4
1+ r4
A2 : x21 =
r4
1+ r4
, x24 =
1
1+ r4
A3 : x31 =
r3
1+ r3
, x33 =
1
1+ r3
A4 : x41 =
r3
r2 + r3
, x43 =
r2
r2 + r3
Case 2. A2 buys g1, g2, g4, and A1 buys g2, g4.
The allocations for agents A3, A4 are the same as above, i.e., x31 =
r3
1+r3
, x33 =
1
1+r3
, and x42 =
r3
r2+r3
, x43 =
r2
r2+r3
. Again we have x31 = x43 and x42 = x33, which implies r
2
3 = r2 ... (1).
Since agent A2 buys g1, g2, g4, we have,
u24−u22
u22−u21 =
p24−p22
p22−p21 , therefore r2 + r4 = 5(1− r2) ... (2’).
A1 buys goods g2, g4 in the proportion r4 : r2. Therefore, x12 =
r4
r2+r4
, x14 =
r2
r2+r4
. Hence,
x24 = 1− x14 = r4r2+r4 .
Since g2 is bought by A2 and A4 only, we have x22 = 1− x12 − x42.
Since the cost of A2’s bundle is 1, p1x21 + p2x22 + p4x24 = 1. Since p1 = 0 and x24 =
r4
r2+r4
= x12,
we have p2(1− x12 − x42) + p4x12 = 1, hence (p4 − p2)x12 − p2x42 − (1− p2) = 0. Therefore,
(r2 + r4)
r4
r2+r4
− (1− r2) r3r2+r3 − r2 = 0. Some algebra, yields the same equation as in the previous
case, (1− r2)r2 + (r4 − 1)(r2 + r3) = 0 ... (3).
We can solve now for r1, r2, r3. Using (1) and (2’) we can express r1 and r2 in terms of r3. Letting
r3 = y, we have from (1), r2 = y2, and from (2’), r4 = 5− 6r2 = 5− 6y2. Substituting into (3), we
get (1− y2)y2 + (4− 6y2)(y2 + y) = 0, which simplifies to y(y+ 1)(7y2 − y− 4) = 0.
The only positive solution is y = 1+
√
113
14 . Therefore,
p1 = 0, p2 = 1− r2 = 1− y2 = 41−
√
113
98
, p3 = 1+ r3 = 1+ y =
15+
√
113
14
,
p4 = 1+ r4 = 6− 6y2 = 246− 6
√
113
98
.
As in the previous case, the value of y gives:
r1 = 1, r2 = y
2, r3 = y and r4 = 5− 6y2.
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In terms of these four values, the allocations of the agents are:
A1 : x12 =
r4
r2 + r4
, x14 =
r2
r2 + r4
A2 : x22 = 1− r4
r2 + r4
− r3
r2 + r4
, x24 =
r4
r2 + r4
A3 : x31 =
r3
1+ r3
, x33 =
1
1+ r3
A4 : x42 =
r3
r2 + r3
, x43 =
r2
r2 + r3
Since this example has disconnected equilibria, we get:
Corollary 19. The Hylland-Zeckhauser scheme does not admit a convex programming formulation.
Remark 20. Observe that in both equilibria, the allocations of all four agents are irrational even
though each one of them spends their dollar completely and the allocations form a fractional
perfect matching, i.e., add up to 1 for each good and agent.
7 The Class FIXP
The class FIXP was introduced in [EY10]. It is essentially the class of problems that can be cast
(in polynomial time) as the problem of computing a fixed point of an algebraic Brouwer function.
Recall that basic complexity classes, such as P, NP, NC and #P, are defined via machine models.
For the class FIXP, the role of a “machine model” is played by one of the following: a straight line
program, an algebraic formula, or a circuit; further it must use the standard arithmetic operations
of +, - * /, min and max. These restrictions imply that the function defined by this “machine” is
guaranteed to be continuous.
The quintessential complete problem for the class FIXP is Nash equilibrium; this was established
in [EY10]. A three-player game may have only irrational equilibria; this was pointed out by Nash
himself [Nas51]. Corresponding to a three-player game, Nash defined a continuous function
on a closed, compact domain via an algebraic formula and showed that the fixed points of this
function are exactly the equilibria of the game. Since Brouwer’s Theorem guarantees existence
of fixed points, each such a game must admit an equilibrium. Nash’s formula uses the standard
algebraic operations and min,max, which implies immediately the membership of the Nash
equilibrium problem in FIXP.
The problem of computing an equilibrium for a k-player game, for k ≥ 3, game is FIXP-complete
[EY10]. In contrast, a two-player bimatrix game always admits rational equilibria and computing
it is PPAD-complete [DGP09, CDT09]; the class PPAD was defined in [Pap94]. The two classes,
PPAD and FIXP seem to be rather disparate: whereas PPAD is contained in function classes NP
∩ co-NP, the class FIXP lies somewhere between P and PSPACE, and is likely to be closer to the
harder end of PSPACE.
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Since we will establish membership in FIXP using straight line programs, we provide further
details on this “machine model” for FIXP. Such a program should satisfy the following:
1. The program does not have any conditional statements, such as if ... then ... else.
2. It uses the standard arithmetic operations of +, - * /, min and max.
3. It never attempts to divide by zero.
A total problem is one which always has a solution, e.g., Nash equilibrium and Hylland-Zeckhauser
equilibrium. A total problem is in FIXP if there is a polynomial time algorithm which given an
instance I of length |I| = n, outputs a polynomial sized straight line program which computes
function FI on a closed, convex, real-valued domain D(n). Because of the restrictions imposed
on the straight line program, function FI will be continuous and by Brouwer’s Theorem, has at
least one fixed point. We require that each fixed point of FI be a solution to instance I. Hence,
a proof of membership in FIXP requires us to provide the domain for function F and a straight
line program which defines F.
8 Membership in FIXP
Let p and x denote the allocation and price variables. We will give a function F over these
variables and a closed, compact, real-valued domain D for F. The function will be specified
by a polynomial length straight line program using the algebraic operations of +,−, ∗, /,min
and max, hence guaranteeing that it is continuous. We will prove that all fixed points of F are
equilibrium allocations and prices, hence proving that Hylland-Zeckhauser is in FIXP.
Notation: We will denote the set {1, . . . .n} by [n]. xi will denote agent i’s bundle. For each
agent i, choose one good from G∗i and denote it by i
∗. If e is an expression, we will use (e)+ as a
shorthand for max{0, e}.
Domain D = Dp × Dx, where Dp and Dx are the domains for p and x, respectively, with Dp =
{p | ∀j ∈ [n], pj ∈ [0, n]} and Dx = {x | ∀i ∈ [n], ∑j∈G xij = 1, and ∀i, j ∈ [n], xij ≥ 0}.
Let (p′, x′) = F(p, x). (p, x) can be viewed as being composed of n + 1 vectors of variables,
namely p and for each i ∈ [n], xi. Similarly, we will view F as being composed of n+ 1 functions,
Fp and for each i ∈ [n], Fi, where p′ = Fp(p, x) and for each i ∈ [n], x′i = Fi(p, x). The straight
line programs for Fp and Fi are given in Algorithm 21 and Algorithm 22, respectively. It is
easy to see that if Fi alters a bundle, the new bundle still remains in the domain; in particular,
∀i ∈ [n], size(i) = 1.
Requirements on F: Observe that (p, x) will be an equilibrium for the market if, in addition to
the conditions imposed by the domain, it satisfies the following:
1. ∀j ∈ [n], ∑i∈A xij = 1.
2. ∀i ∈ [n], cost(i) ≤ 1.
3. ∀i ∈ [n], xi is an optimal bundle for i.
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Algorithm 21. Straight line program for function Fp
1. For all j ∈ [n] do: pj ← min{n,max{0, pj + ∑i∈A xij − 1}}
2. r ← minj∈[n]{pj}
3. For all j ∈ [n] do: pj ← pj − r
Function F has been constructed in such a way that if any of these conditions is not satisfied by
(p, x), then F(p, x) 6= (p, x), i.e., (p, x) is not a fixed point of F. Equivalently, every fixed point of
F must satisfy all these conditions and is therefore an equilibrium.
Lemma 23. If (p, x) is a fixed point of F, as defined in Algorithms 21 and 22, then
1. ∀i ∈ [n], cost(i) ≤ 1.
2. ∀j ∈ [n], ∑i∈A xij = 1.
3. ∃z ∈ G such that pz = 0.
Proof. For the first two statements, we argue below that if any of these conditions is not satisfied
then F(p, x) 6= (p, x), i.e., (p, x) is not a fixed point.
1. If for some i ∈ [n], cost(i) > 1, then Steps 1 and 2 of Fi will modify xi. The subsequent
steps of Fi will not restore the initial value of xi.
2. Suppose that there is a good j such that ∑i xij 6= 1. Since ∑j xij = 1 for all agents i ∈ [n],
there must be a good k such that ∑i xik < 1, and another good l such that ∑i xil > 1.
We claim that then pk = 0. Since ∑i xik < 1, if pk > 0, then line 1 will strictly decrease pk,
and line 3 certainly does not increase it, contradicting Fp(p, x) = p. Thus, pk = 0, the price
pk will stay 0 after line 1, hence r = 0 in line 2, and line 3 will not change any prices.
On the other hand, we claim that pl = n. Since ∑i xil > 1, if pl < n, then line 1 will increase
strictly pl , and since line 3 has no effect, this contradicts Fp(p, x) = p.
But cost(i) = ∑j pjxij ≤ 1 for all i ∈ [n] implies that ∑i ∑j pjxij ≤ n, which contradicts the
fact that pl = n and ∑i xil > 1, hence ∑i plxil > n.
3. Steps 2 and 3 of Fp ensure that there is a good having price 0.
We will next prove that at a fixed point (p, x), xi, must be an optimal bundle for i. Before
embarking on this, we need to prove that if (p, x) is a fixed point with a zero-priced good, then
no step of F will change (p, x), i.e., it couldn’t be that some step(s) of F change (p, x) and some
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Algorithm 22. Straight line program for function Fi
1. r ← (∑j pjxij − 1)+.
2. For all j ∈ [n] do: xij ← xij+r·(1−pj)+1+r·∑k(1−pk)+
3. t ← (1−∑j pjxij)+
4. For all k /∈ G∗i do:
(a) d ← min{xik, tn2}
(b) xik ← xik − d
(c) xii∗ := xii∗ + d
5. For all pairs j, k of goods s.t. uij ≤ uik do:
(a) d ← min{xij, (pj − pk)+}
(b) xij ← xij + d/n2
(c) xik ← xik − d/n2
6. For all triples j, k, l of goods such that uij < uik < uil do:
(a) d ← min{xik, ((uil − uik)(pk − pj)− (uik − uij)(pl − pk))+}
(b) xik ← xik − d
(c) xij ← xij + uil−uikuil−uij d
(d) xil ← xil + uik−uijuil−uij d
7. For all triples j, k, l of goods such that uij < uik < uil do:
(a) d := min(xij, xil , ((uik − uij)(pl − pk)− (uil − uik)(pk − pj))+)
(b) xik := xik + d
(c) xij := xij − uil−uikuil−uij d
(d) xil := xil − uik−uijuil−uij d
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other step(s) change it back, restoring it to (p, x). It is easy to check that Fp will make no change.
The next lemma uses a potential function argument to prove that Fi will not change xi.
Lemma 24. Let (p, x) be such that p ∈ Dp, x ∈ Dx and ∃z ∈ G such that pz = 0. Then, only the
following two possibilities hold about the steps taken by Fi:
1. cost(i) < 1 and Fi strictly increases value(i) while maintaining cost(i) < 1.
2. Fi weakly decreases cost(i) and weakly increases value(i), with at least one change being strict.
Proof. For the first part, observe that if cost(i) < 1, the only step that can kick in is Step 3. If so,
Step 4 maintains cost(i) < 1 and increases value(i).
For the second part, we consider the following four cases.
1. Since cost(i) ≤ 1, Step 1 will set r to 0. As a result Step 2 will not make any change to xi.
2. Step 5 weakly increases value(i) and strictly decreases cost(i).
3. If Step 6 kicks in, then the net change in value(i) is
d
uil − uik
uil − uij uij + d
uik − uij
uil − uij uil − duik = 0.
The net change in cost(i) is
d
uil − uik
uil − uij pj + d
uik − uij
uil − uij pl − dpk =
∆
uil − uij ,
where ∆ = (uik − uij)(pl − pk)− (uil − uik)(pl − pk) < 0.
4. If Step 7 kicks in, then the net change in value(i) is again 0, and the net change in cost is
∆
uil−uij < 0.
Corollary 25. If (p, x) is a fixed point with a zero-priced good, then no step of F will change (p, x).
Next, we observe that if the set of distinct utilities of i, {uij | j ∈ G}, is a singleton, then any
bundle satisfying size(i) = 1 and cost(i) ≤ 1 is optimal. Henceforth we will assume that this set
has at least two elements.
Lemma 26. If (p, x) is a fixed point of F, as defined in Algorithms 21 and 22, then xi is an optimal bundle
for i at prices p.
Proof. We will consider the following exhaustive list of cases. Each contradiction is based on
applying Corollary 25. We will assume that αi and µi are the optimal variables of the dual to i’s
optimal bundle LP and that u = maxj{uij}.
Case 1: Assume that cost(i) < 1. If Bi 6⊆ G∗i , then Steps 3 and 4 will kick in, contradicting the
fact that (p, x) is a fixed point. Therefore Bi ⊆ G∗i . Clearly, u is the maximum utility that i can
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derive from a bundle satisfying size(i) = 1 and cost(i) ≤ 1. Therefore, xi is an optimal bundle
for i. Since cost(i) < 1, by complementarity αi = 0 and hence xi is a Type A optimal bundle.
Henceforth, we will assume that cost(i) = 1.
Case 2: Assume that i derives the same utility from all goods j ∈ Bi and Bi ⊆ G∗i . As in the
previous case, xi is an optimal bundle for i and hence each good in Bi is optimal. If ∃ j, k ∈ Bi
such that pj 6= pk, then we get
αipj = uij − µi = uik − µi = αipk,
implying αi = 0. In this case, xi is a Type B bundle.
Otherwise, since cost(i) = 1, size(i) = 1 and all goods in Bi have the same price, each good in
Bi has price 1. Now, xi is either a Type B or a Type C bundle depending on whether αi = 0 or
αi > 0. However, the latter condition cannot be discerned from xi; fortunately, it does not matter.
Case 3: Assume that i derives the same utility from all goods j ∈ Bi and Bi 6⊆ G∗i . Let k be a good
in Bi and let z be a good having price 0. Each good in Bi must be a minimum price good having
utility uik, since otherwise Step 5 of Fi will alter the bundle. Since cost(i) = 1, size(i) = 1 and all
goods in Bi have the same price, each good in Bi has price 1.
Let l be a good such that uil > uik; observe that any good in G
∗
i is such a good. We will prove that
pl > 1 = pk. Clearly uiz < uik, since otherwise Step 5 will kick in a change the bundle. Hence we
have uiz < uik < uil. However, since Step 6 did not kick in, (uil − uik)(pk − pz) ≤ (uik − uiz)(pl −
pk). Since (uil − uik)(pk − pz) > 0, we get that (pl − pk) > 0. Therefore pl > pk = 1. Hence we
can conclude that the optimal bundle for i at prices p is not a Type A or Type B bundle.
Next, assume for the sake of contradiction that xi is not an optimal bundle for i at prices p; in
particular, this entails that the optimal bundle for i is not Type C. Therefore, i’s optimal bundle
must be Type D and k is a suboptimal good. As argued in Section 5, an optimal Type D bundle
must contain a good of price < 1 and a good of price > 1; let j and l be such goods, respectively.
Clearly uiz < uik < uil. Then we have,
αipj = uij − µi, αipk > uik − µi and αipl = uil − µi
Subtracting the first from the second and the second from the third we get
αi(pk − pj) > (uik − uij) and αi(pl − pk) < (uil − uik)
This gives
(uil − uik)(pk − pj)− (uik − uij)(pl − pk) > 0.
Therefore, Step 6 should kick in, leading to a contradiction. Hence xi is a Type C optimal bundle.
Henceforth, we will assume that cost(i) = 1 and ∃ s, t ∈ Bi with uis < uit.
Case 4: Assume that the set {uij | j ∈ G} has exactly two elements. Clearly, these utilities must
be uis and uit. Now, s must be the zero-priced good, since otherwise Step 5 will kick in. Since
cost(i) = 1 and size(i) = 1, pt > 1. Again since Step 5 didn’t kick in, s and tmust be the cheapest
goods having utilities uis and uit. Therefore, xi is a Type D optimal bundle.
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Case 5: Assume that the set {uij | j ∈ G} has three or more elements. Since size(i) = 1 and
cost(i) = 1, ∃ t ∈ Bi, s.t. pt > 1. Now, any good having utility u must have price > 1, since
otherwise Step 5 will alter the bundle. Therefore, xi cannot be a Type A or Type B bundle.
Therefore, αi > 0.
Suppose that xi is not an optimal bundle. Then there are two cases: that the optimal bundle is
Type C or Type D. In the first case, let k ∈ G be an optimal good; pk = 1. Let j, l ∈ Bi with
pj < 1 < pl and at least one of j or l is suboptimal. Clearly, uij < uik < uil , otherwise Step 5 will
kick in. Therefore we have
αipj ≥ uij − µi, αipk = uik − µi and αipl ≥ uil − µi,
with at least one of the inequalities being strict. Therefore,
(uik − uij)(pl − pk) > (uil − uik)(pk − pj),
and Step 7 should kick in, leading to a contradiction. Hence xi is a Type C optimal bundle.
Next suppose the optimal bundle is Type D. There are two cases. First, ∃ k ∈ Bi such that k is a
suboptimal good for i and there are optimal goods j and l with uij < uik < uil . Then we have
αipj = uij − µi, αipk > uik − µi and αipl = uil − µi
As before we get
(uil − uik)(pk − pj)− (uik − uij)(pl − pk) > 0.
Therefore, Step 6 should kick in, leading to a contradiction.
Second, that there is no such good j ∈ Bi. Let v and w be optimal goods with the smallest and
largest utilities for i. Then all suboptimal goods in Bi have either less utility than uiv or more
utility than uiw. Suppose there are both types of goods, say j and l, respectively. Then Step 7
should kick in with the triple j, v, l. Else there is only one type, say j with uj < uv. Then ∃ l ∈ Bi
with pl > 1. Now, Step 7 should kick in with the triple j, v, l. In the remaining case, ∃ j, l ∈ Bi
with pj < 1 and uil > uiw. Now, Step 7 should kick in with the triple j,w, l.
The contradictions give us that xi does not contain a suboptimal good and is hence a Type D
optimal bundle.
Lemmas 23 and 26 give:
Theorem 27. The Hylland-Zeckhauser scheme is in FIXP.
9 Discussion
The main problem remaining is to determine if the HZ scheme is FIXP-hard. Another obvious
open problem is to obtain efficient algorithms for computing approximate equilibria, suitably
defined. Beyond this, generalizations and variants of the HZ scheme deserve attention, most
importantly to two-sided matching markets [EMZ19a].
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Encouraged by success on the unit case, we considered its generalization to the case of {0, 12 , 1}
utilities. However, resolving whether this case always has a rational equilibrium is quite non-
trivial and we leave it as an open problem. Furthermore, it will not be surprising if even this case
is intractable; resolving this is a challenging open problem.
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